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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, historically disadvantaged status  
often serves as a dividing line with respect to health outcomes.  
For instance, African Americans experience significantly higher 
rates of type 2 diabetes, heart disease, stroke, HIV, obesity, and 
many types of cancer than do their white counterparts.1   
Similarly, rates of obesity, diabetes, and periodontal disease are 
higher for Hispanics than for non-Hispanics.2  These diseases, of 
course, can affect individuals of every background, yet  
frequently, mortality rates for these diseases remain higher for 
historically disadvantaged groups.3  Indeed, these health  
disparities encountered by historically disadvantaged groups are 
so well known that the Centers for Disease Control and  
Prevention (CDC) have maintained a division dedicated to  
improving minority health for more than two decades.4 
These well-documented disparities have also formed the  
basis of multiple scholarly arguments to expand legal protections 
for individuals encumbered by health conditions.  Currently, the 
most extensive protections available to such individuals at the 
federal level derive from the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA),5 Rehabilitation Act,6 and the Genetic Information  
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).7  Yet these laws do not  
completely prohibit discrimination against individuals afflicted 
by health conditions.8  Indeed, an individual may find herself not 
 
 1.  See Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Health  
Disparities and Inequalities Report—United States, 2013 (2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6203.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZKS7-WAW5]. 
 2.  Diabetes Among Hispanics: All Are Not Equal, AM. DIABETES ASS’N  
(July 24, 2014), http://www.diabetes.org/newsroom/press-releases/2014/diabetes-
among-hispanics-all-are-not-equal.html [https://perma.cc/8SFT-TDJJ]. 
 3.  See Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Health Disparities and  
Inequalities Report—United States, 2013 (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
pdf/other/su6203.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZKS7-WAW5]. 
 4.  See Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, About CDC’s  
Office of Minority Health & Health Equity (Nov. 14, 2016), 
http://www.cdc.gov/healthequity/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/DN4J-7SP5] 
(“Although CDC has had an Office of Minority Health in place for over 20 years  
(formerly the Office of Minority Health & Health Disparities or OMHD), in order to 
comply with all provisions of the new statute, CDC organizationally re-aligned and 
re-named its office: Office of Minority Health & Health Equity (OMHHE)”). 
 5.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2012). 
 6.  See 29 U.S.C. § 793 et seq. (2012). 
 7.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff et seq. (2012). 
 8.  See, e.g., Sarah Zhang, The Loopholes in the Law Prohibiting Genetic  
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covered by these Acts, despite suffering from a debilitating 
health condition, because the condition does not fall within the 
statutory definition of disability,9 the venue falls outside the 
reach of the statute,10 or the condition cannot be accommodated 
without imposing an undue hardship.11  To the extent that the 
law continues to permit discrimination on the basis of health 
conditions, historically disadvantaged groups bear the  
disproportionate onus due to their disproportionately high rates 
of affliction. 
The resulting disparate impact of gaps in health-related  
antidiscrimination protections on historically disadvantaged 
populations has inspired a number of calls for reform.  For  
example, Jessica Roberts has previously argued against  
employment policies that penalize health-related conduct  
because of their likelihood to “disparately impact historically 
disadvantaged groups, most notably racial and ethnic minorities, 
people with disabilities, and the poor.”12  Similarly, Stephen D. 
Sugarman has argued for the need for further legal protections 
 
Discrimination, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
health/archive/2017/03/genetic-discrimination-law-gina/519216/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3EGZ-RZ4K]. 
 9.  Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a disability is defined as “(A) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life  
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being  
regarded as having such an impairment.”  42 U.S.C. § 12101(1) (2012).  Although 
federal courts historically interpreted this definition in a narrow manner, the 2008  
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) specifically instructed 
courts to interpret the term “disability . . . in favor of broad coverage of  
individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted.”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012); 
see also Jennifer Bennett Shinall, What Happens When the Definition of Disability  
Changes? The Case of Obesity, 5 IZA J. LAB. ECON. (2016), 
http://izajole.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40172-016-0041-0 [https://perma.cc/ 
TN7F-8XQ7]. 
 10.  For example, prohibitions on disability and genetic discrimination are more 
limited outside employment.  See, e.g., U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity  
Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act Questions and Answers (Oct. 9, 2008), 
https://www.ada.gov/qandaeng.htm [https://perma.cc/TE8P-7KC4] (noting that,  
outside employment, the ADA’s guarantees of equal opportunity for disabled  
individuals are limited to “public accommodations, . . . transportation, State and  
local government services, and telecommunications”). 
 11.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10), 12112(b)(5) (2012) (limiting employer’s  
obligation to reasonably accommodate disabled employees in situations where the 
accommodation would create an “undue hardship,” defined as “an action requiring 
significant  
difficulty or expense”). 
 12.  Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment Discrimination, 
99 IOWA L. REV. 571, 616 (2014). 
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against “lifestyle discrimination” in employment, in part by 
pointing to the way in which certain lifestyle choices (and the  
resulting negative consequences) are associated with race.13  
Most expansively, Jessica Roberts and Elizabeth Weeks Leonard 
have recently argued for sweeping antidiscrimination  
protections—both inside and outside the workplace—against 
healthism, which they define as “differentiat[ion] on the basis of 
health in such a way that leads to systematic disadvantage and 
is normatively wrong.”14  Like prior scholars, their argument 
rests in part on concerns surrounding the questionable  
voluntariness and mutability of health status, particularly for 
ethnic and racial minorities.15  Indeed, even scholars who have 
taken the opposite view, and ultimately support employer  
imposition of health-related penalties, have recognized their  
potentially regressive nature and, in the absence of careful  
design choices, their likelihood of disparately impacting  
historically disadvantaged populations.16 
These prior scholarly arguments have been based on the 
idea, grounded in empirical data, that historically disadvantaged 
groups are more likely to experience health-based discrimination 
because they are more likely to be afflicted by health  
conditions.17  In other words, historically disadvantaged status is 
correlated with poor health status, and poor health status is  
often the target of discriminatory behavior in the form of  
penalties against certain lifestyle choices and health conditions 
that fall outside the ambit of current antidiscrimination  
 
 13.  See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 
24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 410 (2003) (considering the correlation between 
race and life choices, which can lower life expectancy, and the temptation to  
disparately treat racial groups that may follow). 
 14.  Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What is (and Isn’t) 
Healthism, 50 GA. L. REV. 833, 906 (2015). 
 15.  See id. at 853-61 (discussing how some, but not all, policies that penalize 
poor health disparately impact historically disadvantaged populations). 
 16.  See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1517, 1569-70 (2009) (recognizing that “[c]ompany-imposed ‘taxes’ on unhealthy or  
otherwise costly activities might be regressive” but ultimately arguing that  
employers could avoid their regressive nature by “easily tailor[ing the taxes] to the 
individuals’ wealth”). 
 17.  David R. Williams & Selina A. Mohammed, Discrimination and racial  
disparities in health: evidence and needed research, 22 J. OF BEHAV. MED. 20 (2009), 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/davidrwilliams/files/2009-discrimination_and_racial-
williams.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W5E-QUVB]. 
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protections.18  For such cases, the legislative solution proposed 
by Roberts and Leonard, which would prohibit healthist  
policies—that is, policies that both systematically disadvantage 
individuals with health conditions and produce a normative 
wrong—could be advantageous for historically disadvantaged 
populations. 
For instance, imagine an employer wellness program that 
financially penalizes workers with risk factors for heart disease, 
such as high cholesterol and hypertension.19  Given the current 
racial disparities in rates of heart disease and its risk factors,20 
such a policy is likely to disproportionately burden African 
American employees.  Now suppose that, for the employer’s part, 
the policy has purely good intentions—motivated by the idea 
that improving employees’ health will both increase their 
productivity and reduce health-related costs (e.g., health  
insurance premiums and absenteeism) in the workplace—and 
the perverse effects of the policy are wholly unintentional and 
unexpected by the employer.  Such a case may fall outside of the 
protections found within Title VII’s prohibitions against  
disparate impact discrimination on the basis of race, given that 
the policy is arguably job-related (motivated by increasing  
 
 18.  Often cited examples of such lifestyle choices and health conditions include 
tobacco usage, obesity, and life expectancy more generally.  See, e.g.,  
Roberts, supra note 12, at 616; Sugarman, supra note 13, at 410.  Note, however, 
that morbid obesity, clinically defined as a having a body mass index of 40 or higher 
(as distinguished from obesity, clinically defined as having a body mass index  
between 30 (inclusive) and 40), may be protected under the 2008 Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA).  See Shinall, supra note 9. 
 19.  Although the 2008 ADAAA broadened the definition of disability under the 
ADA, thus expanding the scope of the Act’s coverage, discrimination on the basis of 
risk factors for heart disease like high cholesterol and hypertension, without more, 
arguably remains outside the scope of the ADA.  A disability for ADA purposes must 
“substantially limit[] one or more major life activities” or cause an employer to  
“regard[ the employee] as having such an impairment.”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).  
(Given that high cholesterol and hypertension neither directly produce a substantial  
limitation (only their comorbidities and complications may eventually do so), nor are 
they readily apparent to an employer (although they may become increasingly  
apparent through the proliferation of employer wellness programs), these conditions 
will generally fall outside the scope of the ADA’s protections). 
 20.  See, e.g., Garth N. Graham, et al. Impact of Heart Disease and Quality of 
Care on Minority Populations in the United States, 98 J. NAT. MED. ASS’N 1579, 1579 
(2006) (noting the “widespread health disparities for heart disease and related risk 
factors among minorities in America”); George A. Mensah et al., State of Disparities 
in Cardiovascular Health in the United States, 111 CIRCULATION 1233, 1233-41 
(2005) (“Hypertension prevalence was high among blacks (39.8%) regardless of sex or 
educational status”). 
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employees’ productivity) and consistent with business necessity 
(aimed at reducing costs imposed by employees’ poor health that 
are borne by the employer).21  In this case, legislation  
prohibiting healthism in employment could fill in the gaps left 
by current antidiscrimination protections, which produce a  
normatively uncomfortable result. 
The above example illustrates the more general proposition 
that, as long as historically disadvantaged status is merely  
correlated with poor health status, antihealthism legislation 
could provide a complete and satisfying solution to situations 
that are normatively troubling, yet presently lack a legal  
remedy.  More generally, as long as discrimination on the basis 
of health status and historically disadvantaged status are  
additive in nature, novel legislation prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of health, combined with existing legislation  
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national 
origin, religion, sex, and age, would, in theory, sufficiently  
remedy individuals who both have a health condition and are a 
member of historically disadvantaged groups.  The idea that  
discrimination is additive in nature simply means that the total 
amount of discrimination experienced by an individual who is a 
member of multiple protected groups is equal to the sum of its 
parts.22  If true, then a sixty-year-old African American male 
with hypertension could be made completely whole by seeking 
remedies under Title VII for any race-based discrimination he 
experienced in the workplace, under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA)23 for any age-based discrimination he 
experienced in the workplace, and under antihealthism  
legislation for any health-based discrimination he experienced in 
the workplace.24 
The antihealthism legislative solution proposed by Roberts 
 
 21.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012). 
 22.  Bradley Areheart has previously characterized federal courts’ current view 
of multiple discrimination claims as additive, as opposed to multiplicative.  See  
Bradley Allen Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title 
VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 199, 202 (2006). 
 23.  See 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2012). 
 24.  Employment discrimination victims are entitled both to be made whole and 
to be put in their rightful place under federal antidiscrimination statutes.  See  
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (“It is also the purpose of 
Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful  
employment discrimination”); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 
748 (1976) (endorsing a discrimination victim’s right to also “obtain his rightful 
place”). 
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and Leonard is less complete, however, if historically protected 
status has a causal effect on health-based discrimination.  
Instead of being additive in nature, in such a case, multiple 
types of discrimination would be compounding or exacerbating in 
nature, so the total amount of discrimination experienced by an 
individual who is a member of multiple protected groups  
becomes greater than the sum of its parts.25  This concept is  
often referred to as intersectionality.26  Under the dominant  
analytical framework of employment discrimination laws, in 
which courts evaluate multiple claims of discrimination  
separately, intersectional discrimination claims are intrinsically 
unwieldy, and hence unlikely to produce a satisfactory remedy 
for plaintiffs.27  If historically disadvantaged status actually  
increases the level of health-based discrimination, as opposed to 
coexisting with health-based discrimination, then our 60-year-
old African-American male with hypertension would no longer 
be made whole by seeking a remedy under a combination of Title 
VII,28 ADEA,29 and antihealthism legislation.30  In the best-case 
scenario, the separate remedies awarded under all three  
statutes would nonetheless fail to compensate him for the  
 
 25. Elaine W. Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and 
Sex in Employment Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 794 (1981). 
 26.  The theory of intersectionality traces its roots to legal scholars Elaine  
Shoben and Kimberlé Crenshaw.  See Shoben, supra note 25, at 798 (explaining her 
theory of compound discrimination, in which “members of two or more protected 
groups might be ‘disproportionately exclude[d]’ from employment”); Kimberlé  
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist  
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist  
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139 (1989) (explaining the difficulty of  
attempting to fit the “multidimensionality” of African-American women’s experience 
into the single-dimensional framework” of antidiscrimination law recognized by  
federal courts); accord Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief  
(Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 713, 727 (2015) (discussing Shoben’s and  
Crenshaw’s work); Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical 
Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 991-92 
(2011) (“[Crenshaw’s] work has inspired two decades of research on intersectionality 
in many fields, including critical race theory, stratification, social psychology, and 
women’s studies”). 
 27.  Accord Areheart, supra note 22, at 202 (arguing that courts would not  
recognize intersectional discrimination claims on their own, in the absence of  
legislative action); Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 2479, 2481 (1994) (“Many courts have been unwilling to accommodate 
these [intersectional discrimination] understandings within Title VII doctrine”). 
 28.  42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-6 (2012). 
 29.  29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2012). 
 30.  Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14, at 841. 
SHINALLFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/20/17  8:27 PM 
262    BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18.2 
 
exacerbating effects that each form of discrimination had on the 
others.  Even worse, the very nature of intersectional  
discrimination may leave him without sufficient evidence to 
prove one or more of his claims.31  When analyzing this  
plaintiff’s race, age, and health discrimination claims separately, 
a court may be unable to distinguish his employer’s motivations 
from its suspicious actions (i.e., whether they were motivated by 
race, age, or health), and as a result, determine that there is  
insufficient evidence to support one or more of his discrimination 
claims.32 
The proposition that health-based discrimination  
experienced by historically disadvantaged groups may be worse 
than the health-based discrimination experienced by non-
historically disadvantaged groups is more than a hypothetical 
concern.  Rather, prior scholarship suggests its reality.  Based on 
this prior scholarship, this Article will argue that more is  
required than a simple legislative prohibition on healthism in 
order to protect historically disadvantaged groups adequately.33  
Instead, a complete solution to health-based discrimination  
requires recognition, either by legislatures or courts, that other 
types of legally prohibited discrimination may serve as  
aggravating factors.34  In making this argument, this Article will 
first review prior scholarship that points towards an  
intersectional relationship between health and other types of 
discrimination.  Although prior scholarship has heretofore  
focused on the exacerbating effects of sex discrimination on 
health discrimination, it nevertheless raises concerns that other 
historically disadvantaged groups, such as racial and ethnic  
minorities, may also fall victim to intersectional health-based 
discrimination.35  The article will conclude by considering  
possible solutions for intersectional healthism. 
 
 31.  See Best, supra note 26, at 992 (finding that single-basis discrimination 
plaintiffs were two times more likely to prevail than intersectional discrimination 
plaintiffs). 
 32.  See id. at 1018 (noting that “judges tend to believe that intersectional claims 
can be neatly separated” and the harm that causes plaintiffs whose claims could not 
be neatly separated). 
 33.  See infra Section II.C. 
 34.  See infra Section II. 
 35.  See infra Section II.C. 
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II. NAVIGATING THE INTERSECTION OF HEALTH AND 
PROTECTED STATUS 
The Introduction posed a hypothetical situation of  
intersectional healthism that could render a plaintiff without a 
complete remedy, or worse, without any remedy, even under 
Roberts’s and Leonard’s proposal for novel antihealthism  
legislation.  This Part moves beyond the hypothetical to  
document two widespread and systematic instances of  
intersectional health-based discrimination that presently occur 
in the workplace.  As mentioned in the Introduction, the prior 
work examining intersectional healthism has been limited to the 
relationship between sex discrimination and specific types of 
health-based discrimination in the labor market.  Still, this 
scholarship raises broader concerns about the potential for  
racism, colorism, ethnicism, religionism, and ageism to  
exacerbate health-based discrimination in the workplace and 
beyond. 
A. At the Intersection of Sex and Weight 
Discrimination 
Over the past three decades, an entire line of literature in 
economics has explored the role of weight in the workplace.  
These studies consistently find that a greater body mass index 
(BMI)—a simple ratio between weight and height squared36—is 
associated with lower employment rates and lower wages.37  In 
fact, most of the recent literature has been devoted to  
 
 36.  Throughout this article, weight categories are defined according to body 
mass index (“BMI”), which is calculated using the following equation:  
BMI = weight(lb) x 703 / (height(in)).  Using BMI, individuals are then classified as 
underweight if their BMI is less than 18.5, normal weight if their BMI is greater 
than or equal to 18.5 but less than 25.0, overweight if their BMI is greater than or 
equal to 25.0 but less than 30.0, obese if their BMI is greater than or equal to 30.0 
but less than 40.0, and morbidly obese if their BMI is greater than or equal to 40.0. 
Obesity: Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC ONLINE (2016), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/obesity/basics/symptoms/con-20014834 [https://perma.cc/2KU7-H7HL]. 
 37.  See, e.g., Steven L. Gortmaker et al., Social and Economic Consequences of 
Overweight in Adolescence and Young Adulthood, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1008, 1011 
(1993); Susan Averett & Sanders Korenman, The Economic Reality of the Beauty 
Myth, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 304, 306-09 (1996); Jose A. Pagán & Alberto Dávila, 
Obesity, Occupational Attainment, and Earnings, 8 SOC. SCI. Q. 756, 757-58 (1997); 
John Cawley, The Impact of Obesity on Wages, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 451, 468 
(2004). 
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questioning the mechanisms behind the negative effects of BMI 
on labor market outcomes, which has been documented across 
multiple large observational datasets.38  Specifically, economists 
have proposed three hypotheses for these negative effects.  First, 
an employee with a greater BMI may be rendered less  
productive than an employee with a lower BMI because of the 
physiological effects of weight on the body.39  This would, in 
turn, make the employee with a lower BMI more ideal for  
employers.  Second, a greater BMI may raise employers’ costs, 
such as raising the price of health insurance premiums (since 
greater BMI is associated with a long list of comorbidities) or  
introducing accommodation costs (for example, necessitating 
that an employer buy a worker a larger chair).40  Third, the  
negative relationship between BMI, wages, and employment 
may result from taste-based animus;41 such animus could take a 
variety of forms, including employers not liking heavier workers 
or employers perceiving that either their customers or their  
other employees prefer to deal with thinner workers.42 
The negative relationship between BMI and labor market 
outcomes may result from one or more of the above hypotheses, 
but recent evidence suggests that at least some of the penalty 
derives from the third hypothesis, taste-based animus.43   
Although often referred to as “the obesity penalty,”44 the data 
reveals that this negative relationship impacts the labor market 
outcomes of overweight individuals (who have a BMI greater 
than or equal to 25 but less than 30), obese individuals (who 
have a BMI greater than or equal to 30 but less than 40), and 
morbidly obese individuals (who have a BMI greater than or 
 
 38.  See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Distaste or Disability: Evaluating the Legal 
Framework for Protecting Obese Workers, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 101 (2016).  
These prior authors have documented a negative relationship between weight and 
labor market outcomes in all the major publicly available datasets that include  
observations on weight and wages, including the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY), the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), and the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) combined with the American Time Use Survey 
(ATUS). 
 39.  See id. at 124. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 115. 
 42.  For a more detailed discussion of these theories, see id. at 107-22. 
 43.  See id. at 122-34 (arguing that the productivity and costs hypotheses are 
undercut after examining the types of occupations in which overweight and obese 
workers are employed). 
 44.  Shinall, supra note 38, at 106. 
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equal to 40), with the penalty increasing as BMI classification 
increases.45  Juxtaposed with this well-documented penalty is 
the fact that overweight and obesity rates are high and rapidly 
increasing in the U.S. population.  In 1994, only one in five 
adults were obese or morbidly obese (22.9 percent of the  
population) and one in three (33.1 percent of the population) 
were overweight.46  By 2014, 37.7 percent of adults were obese or 
morbidly obese, and an additional 32.8 percent of adults were 
overweight.47  In only three decades, obesity rates increased by 
almost two-thirds, so that today, nearly 70 percent of adults are 
overweight, obese, or morbidly obese.48 
Despite the fact that such a large portion of the population 
endures the obesity penalty in the labor market, legal  
protections at the federal level are limited.49  Early in the ADA’s 
history, multiple plaintiffs filed lawsuits against their  
employers, claiming that obesity was a disability for the  
purposes of the Act.50  This litigation was successful in only one 
instance: in 1993, the First Circuit upheld a $100,000 jury  
verdict awarded to a morbidly obese job applicant in the refusal-
to-hire case entitled Cook v. Department of Mental Health,  
Retardation, & Hospital.51  Other federal courts that heard  
 
 45.  See, e.g., id. at 140-42; Shinall, supra note 9, at 12. 
 46.  Estimates are derived from the National Health Examination Survey for 
adults ages 20 and over from 1988 to 1994.  See National Ctr. for Health  
Statistics, Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevalence of Overweight, Obesity, 
and Extreme Obesity Among Adults Aged 20 and Over: United States,  
1960–1962 Through 2013–2014 (July 18, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs 
/data/hestat/obesity_adult_13_14/obesity_adult_ 13_14.htm [https://perma.cc/U76H-
UJMG]. 
 47.  Estimates are derived from the National Health Examination Survey for 
adults ages 20 and over from 2013 to 2014.  See id. 
 48.  National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases,  
Overweight & Obesity Statistics, https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-
information/health-statistics/overweight-obesity [https://perma.cc/YN2V-D67T] (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2017). 
 49.  Note that ten state and local jurisdictions specifically prohibit  
discrimination on the basis of weight and/or personal appearance.  See Jennifer  
Bennett Shinall, Less Is More: Procedural Efficacy in Vindicating Civil Rights, 68 
ALA. L. REV. 49, 67-72, 99-118 (2016). 
 50.  See, e.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 51.  10 F.3d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1993).  Note that Cook is a Rehabilitation Act 
case since Cook’s employer was a public, not a private, employer, but ADA and  
Rehabilitation Act case law is interchangeable for the purposes of determining the 
existence of a disability.  See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2012) (“The standards used to  
determine whether [the Rehabilitation Act] has been violated in a complaint alleging 
employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under 
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obesity cases prior to 2008 denied relief under the ADA, either 
distinguishing or expressly rejecting the Cook, in finding that 
the obese plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of the Act.52  
With the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008, the obesity jurisprudence 
under the ADA appeared to reverse course due to the more  
inclusive definition of disability (and hence, the more expansive 
coverage) under the Amendments Act.53  Between 2008 and 
2016, multiple district courts concluded that at least morbid  
obesity could qualify as a disability under the amended ADA,54 
and the EEOC successfully litigated two disability cases arising 
out of discriminatory practices against morbidly obese  
employees.55  This uniform stance taken by the federal courts 
with respect to morbid obesity in the years since the ADAAA has 
been recently jeopardized by the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Morriss v. BNSF Railway Company,56 which largely relied on 
pre-ADAAA case law to decide that a morbidly obese plaintiff 
was not disabled for the purposes of the ADA.57 
Even if the Eighth Circuit decision turns out to be an  
outlier, and other federal courts continue to recognize morbid 
obesity as a disability under the ADA, the fact remains that  
neither regular obesity nor overweight have ever been  
 
title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990”). 
 52.  See, e.g., Greenberg v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 
1264 (11th Cir. 2007); E.E.O.C. v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 436, 441, 443 (6th 
Cir. 2006); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997); Andrews v. 
State of Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Shinall, supra note 9, at 5-6. 
 53.  42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012). 
 54.  See, e.g., Whittaker v. America’s Car-Mart, Inc. Case No. 1:13 CV 108 SNLJ 
(E.D. Mo., April 24, 2014); Lowe v. American Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10 CV 24-A-D, 
at 14 (N.D. Miss., Dec. 16, 2010); Melson v. Chetofield, No. 08-3683 Section:(R(3)), at 
3-4 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2009); see also Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Unfulfilled Promises: 
Discrimination and the Denial of Essential Health Benefits Under the Affordable 
Care Act, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 1235, 1267-69 (2017). 
 55.  See E.E.O.C. v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695 (E.D. 
La. 2011); Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Res. for  
Human Dev. Settles EEOC Disability Suit for $125,000 (Apr. 10, 2012), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-10-12a.cfm [https://perma.cc/JF8Q-
MUP2]; L.M. Sixel, Feds Sue Company for Firing 600 Pound Worker, HOUSTON 
CHRON. (Sep. 27, 2011), http://www.chron.com/default/article/Feds-sue-company-for-
firing-600-pound-worker-2191655.php [https://perma.cc/PA89-EMG3]; L.M. Sixel, 
Fired Obese Worker Will Get $55,000, HOUSTON CHRON. (July 24, 2012),  
http://www.chron.com/default/article/Fired-obese-worker-will-get-55-000-3732044. 
php [https://perma.cc/Q85J-8GGL]; see also Shinall, supra note 38, at 111-12. 
 56.  817 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 57.  Id. at 1112-13. 
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recognized as a disability by federal courts.  Yet, as described 
above, the raw data makes clear that these conditions are  
associated with wage and employment penalties (although  
admittedly, the penalties for overweight and obese individuals 
are less severe than for morbidly obese individuals).58  The 
dearth of federal remedies available to the millions of  
individuals whose labor market fortunes are diminished as a  
result of their weight appears ripe for novel gap-filling  
legislation, and the antihealthism legislation proposed by  
Roberts and Leonard initially seems like a viable solution.59  
Ideally, such legislation would provide a remedy for individuals 
whose health condition has heretofore fallen outside the scope of 
federal antidiscrimination protections—like overweight and 
obese individuals—and if future federal courts follow the Eighth 
Circuit, which would also serve as a remedy for morbidly obese 
individuals.60 
Although Roberts’s and Leonard’s proposal might be helpful 
in ameliorating the weight-related penalties in the labor market, 
a closer examination of the data on overweight and obese  
workers questions whether it would serve as a complete remedy.  
Table 1, which presents wage penalty estimates by sex and BMI 
classification, reveals the intersectional nature of weight  
discrimination.61  The top two columns present the raw wage 
penalties for overweight, obese, and morbidly obese men and 
women—that is, the penalties that do not adjust for the  
underlying differences in education, demographics, and job 
characteristics between these groups.62  The bottom two columns 
present the adjusted wage penalties that do take these  
underlying differences into account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 58.  Jose A. Pagan & Alberto Davila, Obesity, Occupational Attainment, and 
Earnings, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 756-67 (1997). 
 59.  Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14, at 906-07 (2015). 
 60.  Id. at 841-43. 
 61.  The estimates presented in Table 1 are derived from estimates first  
presented in Shinall, supra note 38, at 142.  That article used matched data from the 
2006 through 2008 Current Population Survey, American Time Use Survey, Eating 
and Health Module, and Occupational Information Network. 
 62.  Id. 
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Table 1. Wage Penalties for Overweight, Obese, and Morbidly 
Obese Individuals in the Workplace, by Sex 
Raw Wage Penalties 
 Men Women 
Overweight 0.6% -14.6%* 
Obese -8.7%* -22.3%* 
Morbidly Obese -12.4% -34.5%* 
Adjusted Wage Penalties 
 Men Women 
Overweight 3.0%* -4.0%* 
Obese 0.0% -7.4% 
Morbidly Obese -9.1%* -18.4%* 
Notes: Wage penalty estimates are derived from respondents ages 18 to 65 from the 
combined 2006-2008 Current Population Survey, American Time Use Survey, 
Eating and Health Module, and Occupational Information Network data.  Raw 
estimates report the summary statistics by BMI classification.  Adjusted estimates 
are from OLS regressions that include controls for underweight, government 
sector, union status, married, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, geographic 
region (South, Midwest, and West), urban area, years of education, age, and age 
squared.  An * indicates a significant difference at the 10 percent level between the 
normal-weight group and the BMI classification group of interest.63  
 
Turning first to individuals classified as overweight, men 
appear to receive an overweight premium, which actually  
increases in the adjusted estimates.  In contrast, overweight 
women unambiguously encounter a wage penalty in the labor 
market of at least 4.0 percent, when compared to their normal-
weight counterparts.  These wage penalties exponentially  
increase as a woman moves up in BMI classification.  As a  
result, morbidly obese women endure an 18.4 percent wage  
penalty compared to normal-weight women, even after adjusting 
for underlying differences in education, demographics, and job 
characteristics.  Compare these results to the results for  
morbidly obese men, who encounter only a 9.1 percent wage 
penalty (after adjustment) compared to normal weight men—
less than half of the penalty encountered by morbidly obese 
women in the labor market. Moreover, in the adjusted wage  
figures, the penalty completely disappears for obese men.  
Meanwhile, obese women confront a 7.4 percent wage penalty, 
even after adjusting for underlying differences. 
 
63. For more details on these estimates, see Shinall, supra note 38, at 140-42. 
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The numbers in Table 1 indicate that the realities of weight 
discrimination are far more complex than an obesity penalty 
that uniformly applies to all workers.  The data make clear 
weight gain alone does not automatically harm labor market 
outcomes.  Rather, weight gain plus sex harms labor market 
outcomes.  Instead of being a straightforward example of 
healthism, overweight and obesity are more complicated  
examples of intersectional healthism.  That is, in the context of 
weight, it is not “differentiat[ion] on the basis of health . . . that 
leads to systematic disadvantage and is normatively wrong[;]”64 
it is differentiation on the combined basis of health and sex that 
leads to systematic disadvantages and is normatively wrong. 
At first, this distinction may seem like mere semantics.  Yet 
from an enforcement standpoint, the realities of weight  
discrimination pose significant problems for antihealthism  
legislation, such as the legislation proposed by Roberts and 
Leonard, that does not take intersectional discrimination into 
account.  Even if such legislation made health a protected 
class—in the same manner that race, color, national origin, sex, 
religion, age, and disability are protected classes—female  
workers penalized for their weight may nonetheless find  
themselves without a remedy.  Because most employment  
discrimination plaintiffs lack so-called “direct evidence of  
discrimination” (smoking-gun statements by the employer are 
the paramount example of direct evidence),65 the vast majority of 
cases rely on the indirect method of proof, as formulated by 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green66 and its lineage of successor  
cases.67  Under this proof framework, courts’ traditionally  
 
 64.  See Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14, at 906. 
 65.  Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate 
Treatment under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1118-19 (1991) (“[T]he phrase 
‘direct evidence’ is a misnomer.  If direct evidence means anything, it refers to  
evidence that, if believed, would establish a fact at issue.  In disparate treatment  
cases, the fact at issue is discriminatory intent.  Even believing that . . . [a  
supervisor] uttered [a smoking-gun statement] . . . would not establish that he (much 
less the company) had such intent . . . .  [He] may have said the words jokingly,  
ironically, or mistakenly”). 
 66.  411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 67.  See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978) (holding 
that a plaintiff’s prima facie case establishes an inference of discrimination); Texas 
Dept. of Commun. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (holding that the 
defendant merely has the burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory  
reason); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 530 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993) (holding that 
plaintiff’s disproving the veracity of the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory  
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favored method to raise an inference of discrimination is by way 
of the similarly situated comparator, an individual who is  
similarly situated to the plaintiff in all material respects, except 
protected class status, and has been treated better by the  
employer.68  Although this method has been criticized by  
scholars for multiple reasons,69 the example below will clarify 
why it becomes particularly problematic in the context of  
overweight and obesity. 
Suppose an overweight female worker is demoted, and she 
suspects that the demotion results from her employer’s  
discriminatory animus towards her weight.  Further suppose 
that antihealthism legislation becomes a reality, and health is a 
protected class.  Even with this additional legal protection, in 
the absence of explicitly derogatory statements by the employer 
(such as, “fat people are all lazy”), the female worker would have 
to rely on circumstantial evidence of her supervisor’s animus  
towards her health condition.  She could attempt to prove weight 
discrimination by comparator, but this strategy could be  
difficult.  According to Table 1, being overweight is associated 
with a wage premium for overweight men.  If this female  
worker’s employer was similar to most employers in the labor 
market, then any animus towards being overweight would be 
limited to women; even more problematic, being overweight 
might be a positive attribute for men who work for the same  
employer.  Accordingly, any similarly situated overweight male 
employees working at the same company would be at least as 
well off (and perhaps even better off) than normal-weight male 
employees.  In other words, the employer would have a built-in 
defense to claims of weight discrimination brought by female 
 
reason is not necessarily sufficient to prove discrimination); Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000) (clarifying that plaintiff’s  
disproving the veracity of the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason may be 
sufficient to prove discrimination). 
 68.  Accord Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex 
Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1491 (2009) (“The most common method is to 
show that similarly situated employees of a different race or sex received more  
favorable treatment”). 
 69.  See, e.g., Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated 
Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 849-62 (2002); 
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by  
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 206-07 (2009); Suzanne B. Goldberg,  
Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L. J. 728, 748 (2011); Jennifer Bennett 
Shinall, The Substantially Impaired Sex: Uncovering the Gendered Nature of  
Disability Discrimination, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1155 n. 169 (2017). 
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employees relying on circumstantial evidence: “I do not  
discriminate against overweight employees; here are examples of 
all the overweight male workers who are highly successful in 
this company.” 
The employer’s built-in defense would disappear, of course, 
if the female worker were allowed to bring an intersectional 
healthism claim—that is, a claim that she was discriminated 
against neither on the basis of weight alone, nor sex alone, but 
the combination of weight and sex together.  Thus, in the case of 
weight discrimination, legal protections against simple 
healthism70—without further legal protections against more 
complex, intersectional healthism—will leave continue to leave 
many victims without a remedy.  Moreover, as the next section 
will explain, the concerns raised here about intersectional 
healthism extend beyond the isolated example of weight  
discrimination. 
B. At the Intersection of Sex and Disability 
Discrimination 
The exacerbating effect of sex discrimination is not  
necessarily limited to weight-related animus.  The concerns 
raised in the previous sections regarding intersectional weight 
discrimination may extend to health discrimination more  
broadly.  Specifically, prior empirical evidence suggests that sex 
discrimination may also have a compounding effect on disability 
discrimination.71  In fact, a review of all disability discrimination 
charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity  
Commission (EEOC) between 2000 and 2006 reveals just how 
closely sex and disability discrimination are intertwined.72  
Women file disability discrimination charges with the agency 
more often than men,73 even though they are less likely to work 
in risky jobs.74  In industries that are male-dominated, such as 
 
 70.  By “simple healthism,” I mean discriminatory animus that is solely based on 
health status.  Simple healthism lacks any confounding discriminatory animus based 
on other historically disadvantaged statuses, such as animus based on race, color, 
national origin, religion, age, disability, or sex. 
 71.  See Shinall, supra note 68, at 1102, 1113. 
 72.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges FY 1997 –  
FY 2016 (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/PA79-NEX7]. 
 73.  See id. at 1118-20. 
 74.  See Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Gender-Specific Job Injury 
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agriculture, mining, and construction, female workers file  
disability charges at far greater rates than male workers.75  
Male employees, conversely, file disability charges at greater 
rates than female workers in the health care and education  
industries,76 which are female-dominated.77  Moreover, disability 
charges filed by a minority sex within an industry are far more 
likely to be accompanied by a simultaneous Title VII sex  
discrimination charge.78  This apparent relationship between sex 
discrimination charges and disability discrimination charges 
leads to greater overall disability charge filing rates for  
women,79 as the majority of industries in the labor market are 
male-dominated.80 
Of course, greater charge-filing rates do not necessarily  
indicate greater rates of discrimination.  Yet a more  
comprehensive review of the EEOC disability discrimination 
charge universe reveals that men’s charges are no more likely to 
be meritorious than women’s charges, at least from the agency’s 
perspective.81  That fact alone implies that women file  
meritorious disability discrimination charges at greater rates 
than do men.82  In addition, data from the Current Population 
Survey—a large, observational data set administered by the  
Bureau of Labor Statistics that contains information on labor 
market outcomes and disability—indicate that while sex  
differentials exist in the types of disabling conditions, overall 
disability rates do not vary meaningfully by sex.83  That is to 
 
Risks, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 598, 598 (1998) (finding that women’s job-injury risk is 
71% of men’s job-injury risk). 
 75.  See Shinall, supra note 68, at 1132 (displaying ADA charge-filing rates per 
worker graphically, by industry and sex).  In the mining industry, for example,  
women file ADA charges at rates that are more than double the rate at which men 
file ADA charges. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  See id. at 1130-32. 
 78.  This statement holds true for both men and women when they are the  
minority sex within their industry.  See id. at 1134 (displaying Title VII sex  
discrimination charge-filing rates per worker graphically, by industry and sex,  
within the universe of disability charge filers). 
 79.  Id. at 1129. 
 80.  Id. at 1131. 
 81.  Shinall, supra note 68, at 1128-29 (showing that men’s claims are no more 
likely to be rated as meritorious at intake, nor are they more likely to result in a 
finding of reasonable cause). 
 82.  Id. at 1127. 
 83.  Id. at 1124. 
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say, women are no more likely to be disabled than are men.84  
The fact that rates of disability are not higher among women—
taken together with the fact that rates of meritorious disability 
discrimination charge filings are higher among women—forms a 
compelling argument that rates of disability discrimination are 
indeed higher among women, particularly women in  
male-dominated fields.85  Weight discrimination, it seems, is not 
unique in its intersectionality with sex discrimination; rather, 
sex discrimination’s exacerbation of discrimination based on 
health conditions appears to be much broader in scope. 
C. At the Intersection of Historically Disadvantaged 
Status and Healthism 
Taken together, the evidence regarding the intersectionality 
of sex discrimination with both weight discrimination and  
disability discrimination raises two larger concerns for future 
antihealthism legislation, including the legislation proposed by 
Roberts and Leonard.  First, and most obviously, it raises  
concerns that sex discrimination’s exacerbating effects extend 
beyond weight discrimination and disability discrimination to 
health-based discrimination more generally.86  If sex  
discrimination’s intersectional effects extend to discrimination 
based on all health conditions—even those health conditions 
that do not qualify as a disability—then a simple legislative  
prohibition on health discrimination that fails to account for 
such intersectionalities will arguably be less effective for the  
female half of the U.S. population.87  Indeed, a great deal of  
empirical evidence already exists to suggest that disability  
discrimination laws have been more effective for disabled men 
than for disabled women.88  Without accounting for sex-health 
 
 84.  Id. at 1121, 1125. 
 85.  Accord id. 
 86.  See Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14, at 895-96. 
 87.  In 2015, Women comprised 50.8% of the total U.S. population.  United 
States Census Bureau, QuickFacts, 2016, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table 
/PST045216/00 [https://perma.cc/C3PF-9AEN].  In the same year, women comprised 
46.8% of the employed population in the United States.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2015 Current Population Survey Household Data: Annual Averages, Employed  
Persons by Detailed Occupation, Sex, Race, and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity (2016), 
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB29-3988] [hereinafter Labor 
Statistics]. 
 88.  See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of  
Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. 
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intersectionalities, more general health discrimination laws will 
suffer the same fate. 
Second, and more broadly, the prior research on sex-weight 
and sex-disability intersectionality raises concerns that other 
types of discrimination besides sex that are already prohibited 
by law—including racism, colorism, ethnicism, religionism, and 
ageism—may also have intersectional, exacerbating effects on 
healthism.89  To the extent that they do have such effects, a  
simple legislative prohibition against healthism may prove to be 
an ineffective remedy for individuals whose historical  
disadvantage stems from more than just health.  For individuals 
whose disadvantaged status is solely based on health, then a 
simple legislative prohibition on health discrimination would be 
sufficient.  But for individuals whose disadvantaged status is 
based on health plus another protected characteristic, proving 
such an intersectional health discrimination claim may turn out 
to be very difficult, if not impossible, under a simple legislative 
prohibition against healthism.  For all the same reasons any  
intersectional discrimination claim is difficult to pursue under 
current antidiscrimination proof structures, as discussed at the 
end of Part II.A, an intersectional health discrimination claim is 
unlikely to fare much better. 
If race, color, national origin, religion, and/or age  
discrimination have intersectional effects with health  
discrimination—in the same way that sex discrimination  
arguably does—it further narrows the percent of the population 
for whom simple antihealthism legislation would ultimately 
prove beneficial. Currently, 38.4 percent of the total U.S.  
population identifies as a racial and/or ethnic minority,90 and 
 
ECON. 915, 949 (2001) (demonstrating empirically that young disabled women 
worked between 2.37 and 4.57 fewer weeks in the years following the ADA, but 
young disabled men worked between 0 and 3.11 fewer weeks); Kathleen Beegle & 
Wendy A. Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Disability Discrimination Laws, 38 J. 
HUM. RESOURCES 806, 853 (2003) (demonstrating empirically that disabled women’s 
earnings declined by 4.9% after passage of a state disability law, but disabled men’s 
earnings declined by only 1.5%). 
 89.  See Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14. 
 90.  This figure comes from the 2015 Census estimate. United States Census  
Bureau, QuickFacts (2016), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/RHI125215/00 
[https://perma.cc/LR8Z-8HKA].  Racial and ethnic minorities are, on the whole,  
underrepresented in the employed population within the United States.  See, e.g., 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014-2015 Current Population Survey Household Data: 
Annual Averages, Employed Persons by Occupation, Race, Hispanic or Latino  
Ethnicity, and Sex (2016), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat10.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
SHINALLFINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/20/17  8:27 PM 
2017] INTERSECTIONAL COMPLICATIONS 275 
 
close to half of the population is over forty.91  Given the well-
documented correlations between racial and ethnic minority  
status and poor health92—not to mention the well-documented 
correlations between age and poor health93—intersectional 
healthism could theoretically reach a great deal of individuals 
afflicted with health conditions.  Certainly, further research is 
needed to determine whether intersectional healthism actually 
extends beyond sex to other protected characteristics, but to the 
extent that it does, any new legislation prohibiting health  
discrimination must take such intersectionalities into account. 
III. REMEDYING INTERSECTIONAL HEALTHISM 
For Americans in the labor market with health conditions 
that fall outside the scope of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, 
and GINA, antihealthism legislation, like the kind proposed by 
Roberts and Leonard,94 would unquestionably serve as a critical 
first step in increasing their legal protections in the workplace.  
Moreover, to the extent that such legislation would also operate 
outside the workplace, it could expand legal protections even for 
individuals who presently enjoy coverage by disability and  
genetic discrimination laws solely inside the workplace.  Yet, as 
this article has argued, simple healthism—discriminatory  
animus based solely on health—may be surprisingly rare.   
Existing empirical evidence already suggests the frequency and 
severity with which sexism exacerbates healthism in the work-
place (and presumably, outside the workplace as well).   
Considering courts’ historic inability to recognize intersectional 
claims in the absence of express statutory recognition and  
 
CR3U-M9S3] (finding that 20.8% of the U.S. employed population identifies as 
nonwhite). 
 91.  According to 2010 Census estimates, 39.4% of the total U.S. population is 45 
or older.  U.S. Census Bureau, Age and Sex Composition: 2010 (May 2011), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YS5-
PZYM].  Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates from last year suggest that older  
individuals are slightly overrepresented in U.S. workplaces, comprising 44.4% of the 
U.S. employed population.  See Labor Statistics, supra note 87. 
 92.  See, e.g., Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Health Disparities and 
Inequalities Report—United States, 2013 (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ 
mmwr/pdf/other/su6203.pdf [https://perma.cc/94EJ-QBTJ]. 
 93.  See, e.g., Anne Case & Angus S. Deaton, Broken Down by Work and Sex: 
How Our Health Declines, in DAVID A. WISE, ED., ANALYSES OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
AGING 185-86 (2005). 
 94.  See Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14, at 895-96, 906. 
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appreciate the exacerbating effects of multiple types of  
discrimination, the existing evidence both highlights the  
importance of explicitly incorporating protections for sex-health 
intersectionality into antihealthism legislation, and  
contemplates proactive protections against other types of  
intersectional healthism that may already exist, but are less 
well understood. 
Still, given the current political climate, the argument  
presented here regarding new antihealthism legislation may 
seem to be a mere thought experiment in a pure hypothetical.  
The new Republican presidential administration—along with 
the newly installed One Hundred and Fifteenth Congress with 
Republican majorities in both houses—have repeatedly signaled 
their hostilities towards existing civil rights protections, let 
alone new civil rights protections.95  Yet new antihealthism  
legislation may not be completely out of the question in the  
coming years.  Whether or not Democrats like to admit it, all  
existing federal protections against health-related  
discrimination in the workplace have passed during Republican 
presidential administrations: the Rehabilitation Act passed in 
1973 under President Richard Nixon’s administration, the ADA 
passed in 1990 under President George H. W. Bush’s  
administration, and both the ADAAA and GINA passed in 2008 
under President George W. Bush’s administration.96  Indeed, 
 
 95.  See, e.g., Janell Ross, What the Trump Administration Wants You to Know 
about Civil Rights and Policing, WASH. POST, (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/what-does-the-trump-administration-have 
-to-say-about-civil-rights-and-policing/2017/01/23/edf29d4c-e17a-11e6-879b-35666338 
3f1b_story.html?utm_term=.1ed3e0b4260c [https://perma.cc/6QCT-N88U] (arguing 
that “[s]ince Trump’s election victory, his decision to nominate Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-
Ala.) as the nation’s next attorney general has intensified this  
perception” that the new administration “would not be particularly attentive to civil 
rights”); Justin Miller, Trump’s WhiteHouse.Gov Disappears Civil Rights, Climate 
Change, LGBT Rights, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 20, 2017), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2017/01/20/trump-s-whitehouse-gov-
disappears-civil-rights-climate-change-lgbt-rights.html [https://perma.cc/QZN3-
S2GE] (describing the immediate disappearance of civil rights webpages from the 
White House website upon President Trump’s inauguration). 
 96.  One arguable exception to this statement is the Patient Protection and  
Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed under President Barack Obama’s administration 
(and perhaps soon to be repealed), which—among other things—mandated that 
health insurance plans end discrimination based on preexisting conditions.  See 
U.S.C. § 1181 et seq. (2012).  Since this mandate affected both non-employer-provided 
and employer-provided insurance, the ACA indirectly reduced health-related  
discrimination in the workplace.  For a critique of the ACA’s approach to  
antidiscriminatory reform in health care, see Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism: A  
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President George H. W. Bush recently recalled the ADA as one 
of his “proudest achievements.”97 
If this suggestion proves overly optimistic, however, and  
antihealthism legislation like the kind proposed by Roberts and 
Leonard remains unrealized in the coming years, they have 
nonetheless presented a compelling argument for courts to  
intervene and interpret existing health-related protections more 
broadly.  This is especially true with regards to the ADA, which 
holds the potential to have the broadest reach.98  Along these 
lines, the evidence reviewed in this article at the very least  
presents additional grounds for courts to resist their historical 
urges to parse a multifaceted claim brought under existing  
antidiscrimination statutes into multiple, individual claims.   
Instead, courts must recognize that discriminatory animus can 
compound—particularly when health is involved—and open the 
door to consideration of these multifaceted, intersectional claims 
under existing antidiscrimination laws.99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care 
Reform, U. ILL. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (2012). 
 97.  David Crary, 25 Years On, Disabilities Act Has Changed Lives of Millions, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (July 25, 2015), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-
25-years-on-disabilities-act-has-changed-lives-of-2015jul25-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/4HLM-K84Y]. 
 98.  The definition of disability under the ADA, which protects employees who 
work for an employer with fifteen or more employees in the private sector, could be 
interpreted quite expansively.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1) (2012).  Moreover, in the 
2008 Amendments, Congress admonished courts to read the definition “to the maxi-
mum extent permitted.”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012). 
 99.  Indeed, existing antidiscrimination statutes do not prohibit courts from  
considering intersectional claims together, and the Title VII’s “plus” line of cases 
provide an explicit framework for considering sex-plus-health or race-plus-health 
discrimination claims.  For a discussion of how courts can better use the plus  
framework to consider health-based intersectional discrimination claims.  See  
Shinall, supra note 68, at1149-50. 
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